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Abstract
In 2008, a large Salmonella outbreak caused by contamination of the municipal drinking water supply occurred in Alamosa,
Colorado. The objectives of this assessment were to determine the full economic costs associated with the outbreak and the
long-term health impacts on the community of Alamosa. We conducted a postal survey of City of Alamosa (2008
population: 8,746) households and businesses, and conducted in-depth interviews with local, state, and nongovernmental
agencies, and City of Alamosa healthcare facilities and schools to assess the economic and long-term health impacts of the
outbreak. Twenty-one percent of household survey respondents (n = 369/1,732) reported diarrheal illness during the
outbreak. Of those, 29% (n = 108) reported experiencing potential long-term health consequences. Most households
(n = 699/771, 91%) reported municipal water as their main drinking water source at home before the outbreak; afterwards,
only 30% (n = 233) drank unfiltered municipal tap water. The outbreak’s estimated total cost to residents and businesses of
Alamosa using a Monte Carlo simulation model (10,000 iterations) was approximately $1.5 million dollars (range: $196,677–
$6,002,879), and rose to $2.6 million dollars (range: $1,123,471–$7,792,973) with the inclusion of outbreak response costs to
local, state and nongovernmental agencies and City of Alamosa healthcare facilities and schools. This investigation
documents the significant economic and health impacts associated with waterborne disease outbreaks and highlights the
potential for loss of trust in public water systems following such outbreaks.
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Introduction
Community-wide outbreaks associated with public drinking
water systems are rare in the United States since drinking water
regulations were implemented by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), beginning in 1974 with the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) [1,2,3]. However, in 2008 a large community-wide
outbreak occurred in Alamosa, Colorado caused by contamination
of the town’s unchlorinated municipal drinking water supply with
Salmonella serotype Typhimurium.
Alamosa is a small municipality of approximately 8,800
residents situated between two mountain ranges in the San Luis
Valley of south-central Colorado [4]. Prior to the outbreak, the
City’s municipal water was supplied by seven artesian wells and
was not chlorinated [5]. On March 14, 2008, the Alamosa County
Nursing Service was notified of three culture-confirmed cases of S.
Typhimurium among residents of Alamosa, including two cases in
infants. An epidemiologic investigation conducted by local and
state public health authorities identified the city’s municipal
drinking water as the source of the outbreak [5]. From March
192April 11, 2008, Alamosa water was deemed unsafe to drink
and residents were under various water advisories. After April
11th, all areas of the water system had been hyperchlorinated and
all drinking water restrictions lifted.
As a result of the outbreak, 434 cases, including 124 laboratory-
confirmed cases, 20 hospitalizations, and one death were reported;
a telephone survey conducted by the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) at the time of the
outbreak indicated that an estimated 1,300 persons became ill
(CDPHE, unpublished data). Anecdotal reports of subsequent
complications due to Salmonella infections, such as anal abscesses
and adverse pregnancy outcomes, were received by local public
health authorities (W. Brinton, personal communication).
An extensive investigation conducted at the time of the outbreak
involved multiple agencies. Water supply interruptions necessitat-
ed a large-scale response from local, state, and federal agencies,
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including the Colorado National Guard, and volunteer agencies.
The economic burden to the community was thought to be
significant due to business and school closures, missed work to care
for ill family members, and the costs of obtaining potable water
and other supplies. Because of the scope and extent of the
outbreak and response, CDPHE and the local health department
in Alamosa requested assistance from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) to assess the full economic and
long-term health impacts on the community of Alamosa.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This data collection was judged by officials at CDC to be non-
research public health practice, and therefore was not subject to
Institutional Review Board (IRB) review. Nevertheless, written
informed consent was obtained from all participants, and
participants were given the option to refuse specific questions or
to decline responding to the surveys.
Data Collection
We conducted a community-wide household survey to assess the
health and economic impacts of the outbreak; a business survey to
assess the costs incurred by businesses; school surveys to document
closures and costs; a review of billing data from two local health
care systems to assess direct healthcare expenditures; and
interviews with local and state governmental and non-govern-
mental agencies to document costs related to the emergency
response efforts.
Household Survey
In October 2009, we sent or hand-delivered a survey to all
households that received a water bill from the City of Alamosa (as
of September 2009) and surveys were returned via postal mail to
CDC. Survey questions covered topics such as residents’ drinking
water source before and after the outbreak, alternate water sources
used during the outbreak, household illness during the outbreak,
including potential long-term health consequences (e.g., joint, skin,
urinary tract, eye, or other problems occurring within one month
following diarrheal onset), and other demographic and household
characteristics. Households were also asked to report economic
costs associated with the outbreak, including costs associated with
illness (e.g., over the counter medicine and out-of pocket costs for
prescription medications, doctor’s visits and hospitalization),
caring for ill family members, securing alternate water sources
(bottled water or water filters). To calculate indirect cost of illness,
ill household members and caretakers were also asked to provide
information on their occupation and daily wage (see Table S1 in
File S1 for more information). Some questions were posed at the
household-level (e.g., costs for purchase of bottled water) while
others were reported for each member of the household (e.g.
symptoms, occupation, and demographic characteristics). For our
analysis, in order to be consistent with the case definition used
during the outbreak, a case was defined as anyone who reported
diarrhea ($2 loose stools during a 24 hour period) during the
outbreak. An affected household was any household with $1
person who experienced diarrhea during the outbreak.
Business Survey
To describe how the outbreak impacted local businesses
financially, in October 2009 we sent a survey to all businesses
inspected by CDPHE (N = 128), including retail food establish-
Figure 1. Household survey response rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.g001
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ments (restaurants, hotels, nursing homes, and child care centers),
and other businesses (N = 54) potentially affected by the water
shortages (grocery stores, beauty salons, dentists, and animal
clinics). Contact information was provided by CDPHE, or
obtained through a telephone directory and internet searches.
Businesses were asked how the outbreak affected their business,
including whether the business had to close, lay off workers, and
whether the business had to buy additional water or ice, lost or
gained money overall, and if the business ever regained pre-
outbreak levels. To encourage businesses to respond and protect
confidentiality, we did not ask for the business name or address on
the survey. Five of the 128 CDPHE-inspected businesses were
located outside of Alamosa but had clientele likely to be comprised
of Alamosa residents.
Interviews with Governmental and Non-governmental
Agencies, Healthcare Facilities, and Schools
We interviewed via telephone or in-person staff from the City of
Alamosa, Alamosa County Nursing Service, and CDPHE and the
local chapter of the American Red Cross to ascertain estimates of
the direct and indirect cost of the outbreak response to local and
state governmental and non-governmental agencies. Respondents
provided information on the cost of the response (e.g., lodging and
meals for staff, truck rentals, etc.), the number of staff and their
Table 1. Costs to City of Alamosa households associated with an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa, Colorado 2008.
Household Survey City of Alamosa (2008)
(n = 1,732 individuals, 771 households) (N = 8,746 persons, 3,302 households)
Cost($)






cost* Mean Median Total Total (range)
Outbreak-related expenses (n = 771 households)
Bought bottled water 657(85%) 523(68%) $87 $50 $45,530 $135,781 ($30,498–$604,183)
Bought water filtration system 202(26%)
Installation of filter 202(26%) 195(25%) $180 $70 $35,084 $83,536 ($7,760–$336,936)
Maintenance of filter 202(26%) 168(22%) $121 $60 $20,343 $53,715 ($3,974–$232,136)
Stay overnight somewhere else 123(16%) 90(12%) $362 $233 $32,549 $113,266 ($31,749–$403,950)
Subtotal $133,506 $386,298 ($73,981–$1,577,205)
Direct out-of-pocket health care costs (n = 242 households reporting at least one ill person with diarrhea)
Bought items or received medical treatment 194(80%) (0%)
Bought nonprescription medicine 168(69%) 162(67%) $40 $25 $6,483 $18,220 ($4,617–$71,847)
Bought other things (e.g., Gatorade or diapers) 120(50%) 116(48%) $44 $25 $5,102 $13,765 ($4,127–$45,893)
Went to doctor or a clinic 75(31%) 64(26%) $80 $43 $5,116 $12,653 ($936–$54,660)
Received a prescription 32(43%) 28(44%) $17 $13 $463 $1,850 ($397–$5,193)
Had diagnostic tests (e.g., blood or stool test) 37(49%) 35(55%) $96 $30 $3,355 $5,508 ($408–$23,801)
Went to hospital/emergency room 31(13%) 21(9%) $320 $40 $6,725 $10,603 ($784–$45,825)
Subtotal $27,244 $62,599 ($11,269–$247,219)
Indirect cost of acute illness
Ill persons (n = 369)
Work full-time 156(42%) 87(24%) $430 $300 $2,917 $183,644 ($45,663–$480,473)
Work part-time 102(28%) 8(2%) $215 $150 $37,889 $47,083 ($11,716–$123,194)
Non-worker 111(30%) (0%) $0 $0 $0 $0 (n/a)
Caretakers (n = 106 caretakers)
Paid caretakers 11(10%) 7(7%) $178 $110 $1,245 $4,676 (n/a)
Unpaid caretaker (work full-time) 77(73%) 59(56%) $913 $588 $54,165 $148,173 ($31,958–$686,232)
Unpaid caretaker (work part-time) 15(14%) 1(1%) $457 $294 $640 $14,434 ($3,115–$66,844)
Unpaid caretaker (non-worker) 3(3%) (0%) $0 $0 $0 $0 (n/a)
Subtotal $96,856 $398,010 ($97,218–$1,361,419)
Total for Households in Alamosa $257,606 $846,907 ($182,468–$3,185,843)
*Respondents who incurred cost and reported an estimate of that cost (not every respondent who reported incurring a cost provided the specific cost estimate).
{Costs extrapolated to the City of Alamosa as: total individuals/households in City of Alamosa (from census)6% incurring costs (column 3 above)6cost distribution
(Table S3 in File S1) using a Monte Carlo simulation model with 10,000 iterations. Total cost derived from median of 10,000 iterations and range represents the 5th to
95th percentiles of the 10,000 iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation model. See main text and Supporting Information (in File S1) for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t001
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aggregate labor hours spent responding to the outbreak. We also
interviewed Alamosa health care providers, including a hospital,
medical practices, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities to
assess the outbreak impact and to request billing data to
supplement cost estimates from the household surveys (see
Supporting Information and Table S2 in File S1for more
information). To determine the effects of the outbreak on
educational institutions, we interviewed representatives from each
of Alamosa’s two public colleges, two private schools, and its
public school district. School representatives were asked about the
types of additional costs incurred because of the outbreak,
including purchasing bottled water or hand sanitizer, paying for
employee overtime, and costs for make-up days.
Analysis
All survey data were entered into a Microsoft Access 2007
database and descriptive analyses were conducted using SAS v. 9.2
(Cary, NC). We compared survey respondents’ characteristics (sex,
age, race/ethnicity and income) to the characteristics of the 2008
City of Alamosa population [6] using chi-square tests. All p-values
were two-sided and the level of significance was 0.05.
For our cost estimates, we took a societal perspective and
defined costs as expenses which would not be incurred if the
outbreak had not occurred. Since almost all costs were incurred in
2008 and 2009, we did not apply a discount rate. No capital costs
(materials with more than a 5 year useful life) were incurred. All
the costs were recorded in 2008 U.S. dollars.
We built a Monte Carlo simulation model using @Risk software
(Palisade Corporation, NY) to extrapolate the costs to the city of
Alamosa. The model used the following formula (see Table S3 and
Figure S1 in File S1 for more information):
Total cost = Number of individuals/households in Alamosa in
2008 (from census data)6Proportion of respondents who experi-
enced a cost (from household survey) X.
Cost distribution of the given cost (from household survey).
We assumed that the proportion of respondents from the survey
who experienced a given cost was the same proportion in the
community who would have experienced the costs. We used the
costs reported by all individuals/households in the survey to
generate the cost distribution to fit the data for the model. The
details of these cost distributions are given in the Supporting
Information (Table S3 in File S1). Using Monte Carlo simulation
(10,000 iterations), we then extrapolated the costs to the city of
Alamosa and the model’s results are presented as the total cost (the
median of the 10,000 iterations) and range (representing the 5th to
95th percentile of the 10,000 iterations). Additional methodological
details about the model, methods for direct and indirect cost
calculations, and extrapolation methods, are provided in the
Supporting Information (see File S1).
Results
Household Survey
The community survey was distributed to all households that
received municipal drinking water (N = 2,692). After excluding
non-responders and ineligible responses (refusal, out of town
during the outbreak, not on city water, or other reasons) 29%
(n = 771) of households, representing 1,732 persons, returned
surveys eligible for analysis (Figure 1). The median number of
persons per household was two (range: 1–8), and the surveys
analyzed represented approximately 20% of the City of Alamosa’s
2008 population [4]. The majority (n = 458, 59%) of survey
respondents were female; the median age of respondents was 57
years (range: 18–99). Half (n = 391, 51%) of the respondents
identified themselves as white and 31% (n = 240) were of Hispanic
ethnicity; 8% (n = 63) did not provide race or ethnicity informa-
tion. Of the 620 (80%) households that reported income
information, 14% (n = 89) made ,$13,000, 18% (n = 111)
$13,0002$25,000, 24% (n = 150) $25,0002$45,000, 21%
(n = 130) $45,0002$75,000, and 23% (n = 140) .$75,000. Com-
pared to the population of the City of Alamosa, our survey
respondents tended to be older, more likely to be female
(p,0.001), less likely to be of Hispanic ethnicity (p,0.001), and
moderately more affluent (p,0.001) [6] (Table S4 in File S1).
Illness associated with the Outbreak. Approximately one-
third (242/771, 31%) of households, and 21% (369/1732) of
individual respondents, reported diarrheal illness during the
outbreak. Fifty-seven percent (n = 187/329) of ill persons were
female (including four who were pregnant); the median age of ill
persons was 37 years (range: 0–98 years). By definition, all ill
Table 2. Potential long-term health consequences of Salmonella infection reported by survey respondents that were ill with
diarrhea ($2 loose stools during a 24-hour period) (n = 369) during an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa, Colorado 2008.
Potential long-term health consequence n (%)
Days after diarrhea
began that problem





present at time of
survey n(%)
Rash, itchiness or other skin problems 52 (14%) 5 days (0–30) 3 weeks (1–24) 11/52 (21%)
Arthritis, aching joints or other joint problems 51 (14%) 7 days (1–30) 3 weeks (0–16) 20/51 (39%)
Urinary tract problems (e.g., pain or burning during urination
or a discharge)
32 (9%) 7 days (1–30) 4 weeks (1–30) 5/32 (16%)
Eye problems such as pain or redness 19 (5%) 4 days (1–7) 2.5 weeks (1–6) 2/19 (11%)
Abscess (skin, soft tissue, anal, etc.) 6 (2%) 5 days (2–14) 2 weeks (1–3) 1/6 (17%)
Other serious complications (e.g., bowel perforation or peritonitis, septic
arthritis, or endocarditis)
7 (2%) n/a{ n/a{ n/a{
*As reported by 43/52 with skin problems, 36/51 with joint problems, 27/32 with urinary tract problems, 16/19 with eye problems, and 5/6 with abscesses.
{As reported 36/52 with skin problems, by 22/51 with joint problems, 15/32 with urinary tract problems, 13/19 with eye problems, and 4/6 with abscesses.
{Questions were not asked.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t002
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persons experienced diarrhea out of which 30% (n = 110) reported
bloody diarrhea. The median duration of illness was four days
(range: 1–60 days). In total, survey respondents (n = 350) were sick
for 2,341 person-days. Most (n = 194, 80%) of the Alamosa
households with at least one ill person reported buying medicine or
other items because of their illness (Table 1); 31% of households
(n = 75) with at least one ill person sought care, and close to half of
those who sought care reported receiving a prescription (n = 32,
43%) or having a diagnostic test performed (n = 37, 49%) (Table 1).
Twenty-nine percent (n = 108) of all ill persons reported
experiencing $1 potential long-term health consequence of
Salmonella infection, ranging from 14% reporting skin or joint
problems to 2% reporting abscesses or more serious complications
(e.g., bowel perforation, septic arthritis, or endocarditis) (Table 2).
These symptoms began between four days (mean for eye
problems) to seven days (mean for joint and urinary tract
problems) after diarrhea onset. Among those whose symptoms
had abated, symptoms lasted between two weeks (for abscesses) to
four weeks (for urinary tract infections). However, 26% (n = 28) of
those with long-term symptoms indicated that $1 symptom was
still present at the time of the survey (18 months after the
outbreak), ranging from 11% (for eye problems) to 39% (for joint
problems) (Table 2).
Alternate water sources used during the
outbreak. During the bottled water advisory, Do Not Use
order, and boil water advisory, most households reported using
bottled water (either purchased or donated) for drinking, cooking
and brushing teeth (Table 3). Other water sources, such as boiled
or treated tap water and water outside of Alamosa (e.g., at a hotel
or friend’s house), were used less frequently. Despite being told to
avoid using tap water except for flushing toilets during the Do Not
Use order, many households continued to use tap water for at least
some potable and non-potable purposes (Table 4). Half of
households (55%, n = 427) reported boiling water during the 24
days of the water emergency. Eighty-five percent of households
(n = 657) bought bottled water during the outbreak and spent, on
average, $87 (Table 1).
Drinking water impact. Most households (n = 699, 91%)
reported municipal tap water as their main drinking water source
at home prior to the outbreak (Figure 2). Eighteen months after
the outbreak, the main drinking water sources among Alamosa
survey respondents were: bottled water (38%, n = 292/771),
municipal water (30%, n = 233), municipal water with a new filter
installed (15%, n = 119), multiple (12%, n = 94), or other sources
(4%, n = 28) (Figure 2). Taste, safety, and smell were the main
reasons cited for switching from municipal tap water to bottled
water or adding a new water filter after the outbreak (Table 5).
Household economic impacts. Outbreak-related costs for
City of Alamosa residents totaled an estimated $846,907 (range:
$182,468–$3,185,843) (Table 1). The estimated total cost associ-
ated with the purchase of supplemental bottled water, installing
and maintaining new water filters, and paying to stay overnight
elsewhere was $386,298. Direct costs associated with illness (e.g.,
purchasing over the counter medicines or other items, doctors’
visits, prescription medications, diagnostic tests, and hospital stays)
were estimated to total $62,599. Additional indirect costs of acute
diarrheal illness and costs associated with paying for, or lost
productivity due to, care of ill persons and children were estimated
to total $398,010 (Table 1).
Business Survey
We distributed 177 surveys to establishments inside the City of
Alamosa and 5 to businesses located outside the City of Alamosa
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surveys, 21 (12%) were undeliverable and 50 (50/161, 31%) were
returned. The following surveys were excluded: three because the
business was not open during the outbreak and one because it was
a city jail. Forty-six (46/161, 29%) surveys were eligible for
analysis: 41 surveys were included in the primary analysis and an
additional five surveys were analyzed separately because the
business was either located outside Alamosa or not connected to
municipal water.
The 41 businesses located in Alamosa and connected to
municipal water included retail stores (n = 8, 20%), restaurants
or other food service establishments (n = 6, 15%), beauty salons or
barber shops (n = 6, 15%), child care centers (n = 4, 10%), nursing
homes or long-term care facilities (n = 3, 7%), and other types of
businesses (n = 10, 24%); two (5%) businesses did not specify the
type of establishment. One-third (14/41, 34%) of responding
businesses closed during the outbreak (mean length of business
closure: 8.4 days). Approximately half of businesses reported losing
money due to the outbreak, with a median loss of $8,750 (range:
$400–$200,000) (Table 6). One business outside of Alamosa
reported a total loss of $13,967. Four businesses (10%) never
returned to pre-outbreak financial levels, including one business
that closed permanently due to the outbreak. The total estimated
cost of the outbreak extrapolated to the City of Alamosa businesses
that are known to have used municipal water (n = 156) was
$625,561 (range: $14,209–$2,817,036) (Table 6).
Governmental and Nongovernmental Agencies,
Healthcare Facilities, and Schools
Outbreak response cost estimates to local, regional, and state
governmental and volunteer organizations totaled $823,314
(Table 7). This estimate primarily included the governmental
response costs for the National Guard, incident management
teams, and personnel, and other costs (such as transportation,
supplies, lodging, etc.) at state, county, and local levels. The
volunteer response, coordinated primarily by the American Red
Cross, lasted 21 days, involved 1,035 people who contributed over
Table 4. Number and percent of households that reported using any tap water for the following purposes during the various
water advisories (n = 771 households) associated with an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa, Colorado 2008.
Bottled Water Advisory* Do Not Use Order{ Boil Water Advisory{
(March 19–24, 2008) (March 25–April 3, 2008) (April 3–11, 2008)
Drinking 71(9%) 25(3%) 58(8%)
Cooking 212(28%) 73(9%) 233(30%)
Washing dishes 414(54%) 191(25%) 456(59%)
Brushing teeth 145(19%) 58(8%) 116(15%)
Showering/Bathing 516(67%) 256(33%) 498(65%)
*During the bottled water advisory, residents were told to use bottled water for drinking, cooking, brushing teeth, and dishwashing but that if no bottled water was
available they could boil their water.
{During the Do Not Use order, while the distribution system was being hyperchlorinated, residents were told to only use their tap water for flushing toilets.
{During the boil water advisory, residents were told to boil their water before using it for drinking, cooking, or brushing teeth.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t004
Figure 2. Change in water source after the outbreak (n = 771 households) following an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa,
Colorado 2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.g002
Salmonella Drinking Water Outbreak–CO, 2008
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e57439
5,289 hours to the effort, and totaled an estimated $80,710
(Table 7).
Most health care providers reported significant expenses in
securing and providing clean water (for drinking, bathing,
housekeeping and other uses) or disposable supplies. However,
these costs could not be estimated because most could not
retrospectively itemize these expenses. Only one local hospital was
able to provide billing records for outbreak-related care it provided
to 104 of the 124 laboratory-confirmed cases. The estimated total
cost of health insurance payments for Alamosa City residents that
sought health care was $244,985 (range: $65,615–$928,915)
(Table 8). The five public and private schools and colleges were
closed for, on average, 2 days (range: 0 to 5) due to the outbreak.
However, anecdotally we learned that the outbreak occurred
during spring break for most of the five public and private schools
and colleges in Alamosa, which helped minimize the impact of
school closures. Only two schools reported any substantial
financial impact, which totaled $23,898 (Table 9). These costs
were related to paying overtime and purchasing bottled water and
other items.
Total Costs
The total estimated economic impact of the outbreak, including
costs to City of Alamosa residents, businesses, schools, and
healthcare facilities and the governmental and non-governmental
outbreak response was approximately $2.6 million (range: $1.1
million–$7.8 million dollars) (Table 9). The largest contributors
(32.8%) to this cost were direct and indirect costs for City of
Alamosa residents, followed by the cost of the outbreak response to
governmental organizations (26.4%), and costs to Alamosa
businesses (24.3%).
Discussion
Since passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act and its
amendments by EPA [1,2,3], community-wide drinking water
outbreaks in the U.S. are rare [7]. The Salmonella outbreak that
occurred in Alamosa, Colorado in 2008 was one of the largest
drinking water-associated outbreaks reported in the U.S. since the
1993 Cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee, which sickened an
estimated 400,000 people [8]. The estimated economic impact of
the Alamosa outbreak totaled over $2.6 million. An unanticipated
consequence of the outbreak was the loss of trust in the public
water system after the outbreak.
Despite our comprehensive approach, this outbreak cost
estimate is lower than previous epidemiologic studies of outbreaks
in public water systems, perhaps due to our conservative
methodological approach and the differences in the size of the
affected population or duration of the outbreak. Harrington et al.
estimated the economic impact of a 1984 waterborne outbreak of
Table 5. Reasons households cited for switching from tap water as a main drinking water source to bottled water as a main
drinking water source (n = 249) or installing a new water filter (n = 114) after an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa, Colorado 2008.




Color or other reason 29(12%) 16(14%)
*Categories are not mutually exclusive so percentages can sum to .100%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t005
Table 6. Outbreak-associated costs to City of Alamosa businesses associated with an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa,
Colorado 2008.
Business Survey (n = 46)
Extrapolated to Sample of
City of Alamosa Businesses (N = 156)
Reported in survey Estimated using simulation model*
n(%) Mean Median Total (range)
Businesses inside Alamosa and on city water (n = 41)
Lost money 22(54%) $35,306 $8,750 $625,561 ($14,209–$2,817,036)
No change 17(41%)
Did better because of the outbreak 2(5%)
Businesses outside Alamosa or not on city water (n = 5)
Lost money 1(20%) $13,967 $13,967 $13,967 n/a
No change 3(60%)
Did better because of the outbreak 1(20%)
Total 639,528 ($28,176–$2,831,003)
*Costs extrapolated to the City of Alamosa as: total businesses on municipal water (N = 156)6% incurring costs (column 3 above)6cost distribution (Table S3 in File S1)
using a Monte Carlo simulation model with 10,000 iterations. Total cost derived from median of 10,000 iterations and range represents the 5th to 95th percentiles of the
10,000 iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation model. See main text and Supporting Information (in File S1) for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t006
Salmonella Drinking Water Outbreak–CO, 2008
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e57439
giardiasis in a Pennsylvania county at $18.2–133.3 million (in 2008
dollars) and did not include the cost of the outbreak response or
the impact on local businesses [9]. The outbreak occurred in a
community of 25,000 households, resulted in 370 cases of
giardiasis and a boil water advisory that lasted at least 99 days
(270 days for half of those affected). Corso et al. estimated that the
massive 1993 cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
(population , 1.6 million) affecting 403,000 individuals cost an
estimated $143.4 million (in 2008 dollars) in direct healthcare
expenditures and productivity losses [10]; the cost of using an
alternate water source during the outbreak, costs to local
businesses, and the cost of the outbreak response were not
included. Despite these differences, the limited number of cost
analyses for waterborne outbreaks underscores the need to
conduct these analyses for future outbreak investigations and the
utility of including longer follow-up investigations to capture long-
term costs.
In our assessment, 31% of households and 21% of survey
respondents became ill during the outbreak. Approximately one-
third of those who became sick reported a potential long-term
health consequence following their diarrheal illness and, of those,
26% were still experiencing symptoms 18 months after the
outbreak. Because all symptoms were based on self-report, and
may have been coincidental to, rather than caused by the
Salmonella outbreak, we included only symptoms that began within
30 days of diarrheal illness. In addition, similar frequencies of post-
Salmonella infection joint pain [11,12] and other symptoms [13]
have been observed in previous studies, including a Canadian
study that found that such symptoms can persist for three years
post-infection [14]. Although they were rare, we also found that
2% of cases experienced a more serious complication of infection
such as bowel perforation, peritonitis, septic arthritis, or endocar-
ditis, complications from Salmonella infection that have been
reported elsewhere [15]. Unfortunately, we were unable to
estimate the direct and indirect costs associated with these long-
term sequelae. However, the time and costs associated with these
are likely to have been substantial. For instance, patients with
arthritis and other rheumatologic conditions had average annual
medical care expenditures of $1,891 and earned $1,590 less than
individuals without these conditions in 2003 [16]. Additionally,
urinary tract infections cost an estimated $1.6 billion per year in
1994 in direct and indirect costs [17].
Over 90% of households reported that municipal water was
their main drinking water source at home prior to the outbreak.
After the outbreak, 38% of respondents mainly drank bottled
water and only 30% of households continued to primarily drink
tap water; an additional 15% purchased a new filter or filtration
system. The purchase of bottled water and installation and
maintenance of filters cost City of Alamosa residents approxi-
mately $273,000 during the outbreak. Almost half (45%) of survey
Table 7. Outbreak response costs associated with an
outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa, Colorado 2008.
Personnel Other* Total
Governmental organizations
Federal Government $19,040{ $19,040
State of Colorado $215,925 $316,449{ $532,374
Alamosa County $52,817 $7,582 $60,399
City of Alamosa $50,872 $19,023 $69,895
Non-governmental organizations
Volunteer organizations $40,135# $40,575 $80,710
Other organizations $60,896{ $60,896
Total $439,685 $383,629 $823,314
*Includes transportation, supplies, lodging, etc.
{As captured by City of Alamosa record-keeping.
{Includes expenses covered by the state disaster fund (e.g., National Guard,
incident management teams); these were all included in the ‘‘Other’’ category
because personnel costs were not reported separately from other expenses.
#Includes $7,920 for staff overtime (3 persons and a total of 750 hours of
overtime) and $32,215 in estimated indirect costs associated with volunteer
time (4,589 volunteer hours estimated at Colorado minimum wage rate of
$7.02/hour).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t007
Table 8. Health insurance payments for Alamosa City residents that sought healthcare during an outbreak of salmonellosis,
Alamosa, Colorado 2008.
Household
Survey Hospital A Cost Estimates Extrapolated to City of Alamosa
(n = 1,732)
(n = 104 culture-confirmed cases
and 139 separate healthcare visits) (N = 8,746)
Cost ($){
n(%) n(%) Mean Median N(%){ Total (range)
Ill Persons 369(21%) 1,423(16%)
Sought care 107(29%) 413(29%)
Clinic/doctors’ office* 76(71%) 67(48%) $129 $93 293(71%) $26,275 ($6,430–$107,324)
Emergency department 22(21%) 67(48%) $693 $390 85(21%) $36,600 ($7,351–$182,111)
Hospitalized 9(8%) 5(4%) $7,011 $3,159 35(8%) $182,110 ($51,834–$639,480)
Total 139 $244,985 ($65,615–$928,915)
*Because data were obtained from the hospital only, clinic/doctor’s office visit costs only include laboratory but not physicians’ fees.
{We have removed the background rate of diarrhea in the population (5%) to get the percent of illness due to outbreak (21%25% = 16%). The number of ill persons was
the denominator for subsequent proportions who incurred the costs (e.g., 29%,71%, 21% and 8%).
{Costs extrapolated to the City of Alamosa as: total population (N = 8,746)6% incurring costs (column 3 above)6cost distribution (Table S3 in File S1) using a Monte
Carlo simulation model with 10,000 iterations. Total cost derived from median of 10,000 iterations and range represents the 5th to 95th percentiles of the 10,000
iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation model. See main text and Supporting Information (in File S1) for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t008
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respondents cited safety concerns as a reason for switching from
tap to bottled water. This lack of trust was also apparent in survey
participants’ comments, such as: ‘‘I will never again fully trust the
system or drink any tap water without some concern…’’ and ‘‘I
still don’t feel safe drinking or cooking with the city water… I have
spent a lot of money buying bottled water.’’
The economic impact of the outbreak on the sample of
businesses was one of the largest expenses, totaling $626,000 and
accounting for 24% of the total outbreak costs. Approximately half
of businesses that responded indicated that they lost money and
approximately one-third had to close temporarily during the
outbreak. Only 60% reported ever returning to pre-outbreak
financial levels, including one that noted that ‘‘it took 2–3 months
to get back to previous levels.’’ Because the survey was sent 18
months after the outbreak, it could have failed to reach businesses
that might have been forced to close because of the outbreak.
Household survey responses corroborated this; one respondent
noted that ‘‘we couldn’t pay our mortgage [and] lost our
restaurant. We now both work for someone else for not as much
pay. We had our restaurant for 25 years.’’
This assessment was subject to several limitations. First, our
outbreak cost estimate is likely an underestimate. It does not
include health care costs for individuals who sought care outside of
Alamosa (either because some ill individuals may not have
responded to the survey or because we were only able to obtain
hospital-associated costs from one local hospital). We also were
unable to assign an estimate for the one death associated with the
outbreak. Alamosa is the geographic and commercial center of the
San Luis Valley, and many people from surrounding areas work
and dine in Alamosa but the survey did not capture business-
related costs or health impact for people who live outside of
Alamosa or for businesses that either did not receive a survey or
did not respond. Additionally, outbreak response costs incurred by
the federal government and by local organizations or municipal-
ities outside the City of Alamosa that contributed to the outbreak
response are likely incomplete. Household survey respondents also
mentioned various costs not covered in the questionnaire, such as
the cost of gas, disposable plates/utensils, or pet care associated
with the outbreak. Additionally, direct and indirect costs
associated with the long-term health consequences of Salmonella
infection were not assessed. Outbreak-associated costs were also
limited to those incurred during the outbreak, even though it is
likely that many costs have been incurred since the outbreak.
Second, we assumed that the survey respondents were a
representative sample of the City of Alamosa population, yet our
survey respondents differed by age, sex, ethnicity, and socioeco-
nomic status [6]. In addition, our survey was conducted 18 months
after the outbreak, and persons who responded to the survey may
have been more likely to be sick during the outbreak and therefore
to respond to the survey, although the attack rate estimated from
our household survey is similar to the estimate found in a survey of
Alamosa residents immediately after the outbreak (CDPHE,
unpublished data). Third, our indirect cost estimates were based
on assumptions (see Supporting Information in File S1 for details)
about the value of caretakers’ and ill people’s time. However, the
wages reported in our survey were similar to that reported for the
Colorado non-Metropolitan Statistical Area that includes Alamosa
[18]. Finally, our relatively low response rate (, 30%), although
similar to that of other mailed surveys [19], may mean that the
results of the household and business surveys are not reflective of
the experiences of all City of Alamosa households and businesses.
The likely source of the outbreak was determined to be animal
contamination of a storage tank that had numerous cracks and
entry points [5]. This outbreak highlights the critical importance of
robust inspection of public drinking water storage facilities,
identification of system deficiencies during required sanitary
surveys, and maintaining staffing and resources for adequate
follow-up for any deficiencies identified. Although it is now being
chlorinated, the City of Alamosa’s water prior to the outbreak was
derived from an unchlorinated ground water source. The recently
promulgated Ground Water Rule (GWR) [20,21] requires most
community water systems to complete initial sanitary surveys by
Table 9. Total costs associated with an outbreak of salmonellosis, Alamosa, Colorado 2008.
Total (range) % of total
City of Alamosa households $846,907 ($182,468–$3,185,843) 32.8%
Outbreak-related expenses $386,298 ($73,981–$1,577,205)
Direct out-of-pocket health care costs $62,599 ($11,269–$247,219)
Indirect costs of acute illness and caretaking $398,010 ($97,218–$1,361,419)
Alamosa businesses $625,561 ($14,209–$2,817,036) 24.3%
Businesses outside the City of Alamosa $13,967 n/a 0.5%
Governmental organizations $681,708 n/a 26.4%
Federal Government $19,040 n/a
State of Colorado $532,374 n/a
Alamosa County $60,399 n/a
City of Alamosa $69,895 n/a
Non-governmental organizations $141,606 n/a 5.5%
Volunteer organizations $80,710 n/a
Other $60,896 n/a
Health insurance payments $244,985 ($65,615–$928,915) 9.5%
School and colleges $23,898 n/a 0.9%
Grand Total $2,578,632 ($1,123,471–$7,792,973) 100%
Details provided in Tables 1, 6 & 8. Extrapolation done using Monte Carlo simulation model. See main text and Supporting Information in File S1 for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057439.t009
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2012. Once fully implemented, it should help reduce the risk for
similar outbreaks in the future. Nevertheless, a deficiency in the
distribution system (i.e., storage tank contamination) was the
primary cause of this outbreak. Maintaining the integrity of the
nation’s drinking water systems is a fundamental safeguard to
protecting public health and preventing economic damage from
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